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The U.S. Supreme Court should craft more manageable legal and
evidentiary tools that courts can use to review future campaign re-
forms. Commentators and courts have extensively analyzed the man-
ageability of judicial tools employed to review other political proc-
esses, such as partisan gerrymandering,' the use of race in
implementing the Voting Rights Act,2 and the relative population of
legislative districts. Indeed, the key electoral doctrine of "one person,
one vote was adopted precisely because it is administrable. Al-
though manageable standards are no less relevant to judicial review
of campaign finance regulations, the issue remains largely unexam-
ined.4
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I See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 155-56 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that the standard adopted by the plurality will "prove unmanageable and arbitrary" and re-
sult in "greater judicial intrusion into the apportionment process").
See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1012 n.9 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing
that "determining the 'predominant' motive" of the legislature "is not a simple matter," and
may be impossible) (citing Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971)).
3 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (holding that "the Equal Protection Clause
requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a
population basis" and that "an individual's right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally
impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citi-
zens living in other parts of the State"); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 124-25
(1980) (explaining that the Court adopted a one-person, one-vote rule "precisely because of consid-
erations of administrability"); SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAw OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 175 (2d ed. 2001) (suggesting that "the one-person, one-
vote rule based on strict population equality could be readily managed by the courts and thus
allowed ajusticiable standard for judicial immersion into the 'political thicket' of elected insti-
tutions").
4 In 1977,Judge Harold Leventhal highlighted courts' relative inexperience with problems
of political organization, and counseled judges to proceed pragmatically and carefully, to avoid
a rush to judgment based on speculation, and to avoid dogma that precludes reconsideration
and correction. While he emphasized the importance of judicial humility and caution in re-
viewing campaign finance regulations, Judge Leventhal did not propose that the Supreme
Court adopt doctrines that provide additional judicial guidance. See Harold Leventhal, Courts
and Political Thickets, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 345, 376, 378-80, 387 (1977).
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A special three-judge court's fractured decision in McConnell v.
FEC illustrates the need for greater doctrinal guidance. 5 The confus-
ing opinion totaled more than 1600 pages, with each judge writing
separately. A rough summary provides: Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly
voted to uphold various provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Re-
form Act of 2002 ("BCRA") 6Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson voted
to invalidate most provisions, and Judge Richard Leon adopted a
middle position. Although lower courts generally handle fact-
finding, the three judges' disagreements prevented them from devel-
oping a complete factual record in the case.
Personality conflicts and ideological squabbles alone do not ac-
count for the differences among the three judges. Campaign finance
doctrine itself also deserves blame. Current doctrine provides judges
too little guidance in making legal conclusions or factual determina-
tions. As a result, greater opportunity exists for individual judges' po-
litical inclinations for or against campaign reform to influence out-
comes, which in turn leads to inconsistent decisions.
For example, because "substantial overbreadth" in the campaign
finance context lacks clarity of meaning, the three judges went differ-
ent ways on the question as to whether the primary definition of elec-
tioneering communications was "substantially overbroad." Under the
primary definition, corporations and unions are prohibited from us-
ing their general treasury funds to finance targeted advertisements
that refer to a federal candidate and are broadcast during the sixty-
day period before a general election.7
Under traditional First Amendment doctrine, substantial over-
breadth occurs when the proportion of applications of the statute
that do not advance the state's interest is substantially high relative to
the applications of the statute that do advance the state's interest."
Courts must address two questions to determine if a law is substan-
tially overbroad-a factual question and a legal question. Because
campaign finance doctrine provides inadequate guidance on how to
answer either one, judges' individual political philosophies about re-
form influence decisions.
5 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C.) (threejudge court), prob. juris. noted, 123 S. Ct. 2268 (2003)
(mem.).
6 See Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, §§ 201, 203, 116 Stat. 81, 80-90, 91.
8 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) ("[W]e believe that the overbreadth
of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep."); Richard L. Hasen, Measuring Overbreadth: Using Empirical Evidence to
Determine the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Laws Targeting Sham Issue Advocacy, 85 MINN. L.
REv. 1773, 1782-83 (2001) ("The key point appears to be that the question of substantial over-
breadth involves a comparative effort; one looks at the proportion of overbroad applications of
the statute compared to legitimate ones.").
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I. UNCLEAR ON THE FACTS
First the factual question: which applications of the primary elec-
tioneering provision do not advance the state's interest of preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption?
Based on the evidence, Judge Leon found that as much as 17 per-
cent of the speech regulated by the law would be "genuine issue ad-
vocacy" because it was not directed at influencing federal elections.9
For example, the electioneering provision's bar on mentioning fed-
eral candidates would restrict corporate and union spending on ads
that support or attack some federal legislation that is named after
congressional sponsors, such as Sarbanes-Oxley. Therefore, accord-
ing to Judge Leon, the regulation of such speech would not advance
any state interest in preventing corruption.
Judge Kollar-Kotelly was more skeptical of the finding that 17 per-
cent of the speech regulated posed no threat of corruption. She
noted that strong arguments existed that the percentage was actually
lower, and highlighted the fact that one person's genuine issue advo-
cacy is another person's electioneering communication.'0
Judge Henderson went the opposite direction, finding that the
electioneering provisions did not prevent corruption and failed to
advance any other state interest."I
While judges may differ on the facts in all types of cases, in the
campaign finance context a lack of clear standards exacerbates these
differences. In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, the Court
stated that "[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy
heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or
down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised."'
Well, sure, but "novel" to whom? At what point along the contin-
uum of plausibility do judges ratchet up the evidentiary require-
ments? To Judge Henderson, it was implausible that the electioneer-
ing provisions prevented corruption."' To Judge Kollar-Kotelly, the
fact that many ads labeled "genuine issue advocacy" were designed to
influence the election and curry favor was not only plausible, but
likely. 14 Shrink does not instruct judges on how to build a factual re-
9 See McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 798-99 (Leon,J.).
10 Id. at 635-36 (Kollar-Kotelly,J.).
1 Id. at 369 (Henderson,J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
12 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000).
15 See McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 324 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part) ("The record reflects that BCRA's ban on corporate and labor dis-
bursements for electioneering communications will not prevent actual or apparent corruption
of federal candidates.").
14 Id. at 453 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) ("[P]olitical party 'issue advocacy' campaigns are targeted at
federal elections, particularly competitive races, and are intended to, and do affect the outcome
of those contests.").
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cord in the campaign finance context. Instead, it invites them to
make factual assumptions that support the legal conclusion they
think best.
II. UNCLEAR ON THE LAW
Even if the judges could agree on the facts, questions remain
about the legal standard to use in determining whether a statute is
substantially overbroad. Judge Kollar-Kotelly's emphasis on prevent-
ing corruption and closing regulatory loopholes led her to reject
overbreadth claims. Even if 17 percent of the ads posed no threat of
corruption or the appearance of corruption, the "overwhelming ma-
jority" of the restricted ads posed such a threat. While 17 percent
may not have been too much for Judge Kollar-Kotelly, it was too
much for Judge Leon. Consequently, he struck down the primary
provision as "substantially overbroad.' ' 16 Judge Henderson was at the
other end of the spectrum from Judge Kollar-Kotelly regarding the
meaning of substantial overbreadth. Judge Henderson read prior
cases as setting forth a firm constitutional rule effectively announcing
that any regulation of spending on political speech was substantially
overbroad unless all of the speech regulated included "express advo-
cacy.
As evidenced by the lower court's fractured opinions, judges lack
both evidentiary and legal standards in reviewing campaign reforms.
One should not be surprised that an individual judge's assumptions
about democracy fill the void in fact-finding and legal decision mak-
ing.
III. THE COSTS OF FUZZY DOCTRINE
The proposition that democratic assumptions shape campaign fi-
nance perspectives is nothing new. To a certain extent, such assump-
tions explain the differences between the legislative agendas of re-
formers and those skeptical of reform. But unique issues arise when
assumptions about politics explain the differences between the opin-
ions ofJudges Kollar-Kotelly and Henderson.
Justice Frankfurter's warning that courts should not enter the po-
litical thicket without manageable tools is particularly relevant in the
campaign finance context. '  Federal courts are not democratically
:5 Id. at 628 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
6 Id. at 798-99 (Leon,J.).
7 Id. at 364-66 (Henderson,J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
18 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 268 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[Judges] do not
have accepted legal standards or criteria or even reliable analogies [in the reapportionment
context] to draw upon for making judicial judgments."); see also id. at 217 (majority opinion)
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accountable, they lack political expertise, and they possess fewer
comprehensive fact-finding tools. Courts cannot readily revise past
decisions to respond to the unanticipated consequences that often
arise in the campaign finance arena. The lack of judicial guidance
leaves too much room for political preferences of individual judges to
influence outcomes, results in an incoherent doctrine, and compro-
mises the credibility of the federal bench. Legislatures, unclear about
the shape of constitutionally permissible regulation, often lack the
will to enact what citizens perceive as much-needed reforms.
Further, there are constitutional costs. A judge can emphasize
"the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption" to
justify rejecting almost any overbreadth claim. At the other end of
the spectrum, overly aggressive judicial invalidation of reforms un-
dermines the authority that Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution
delegates to Congress to regulate federal elections. 9
This short Essay highlights the importance of judicial manageabil-
ity with the hope that judges and scholars will consider this value in
crafting tools to review campaign finance regulations. As they engage
in this undertaking, judges and scholars should devise clearer eviden-
tiary requirements that explicitly allocate burdens and standards of
proof, and describe the types of proof needed to establish certain
propositions. They should also develop legal norms that provide
more guidance than the status quo. The quest for enhanced guid-
ance does not mean, however, that judges and scholars should adopt
rigid rules that mechanically sacrifice other relevant values, like indi-
vidual autonomy, electoral competition, democratic deliberation, and
widespread participation.
Pointing fingers at the three-judge panel for its bloated and in-
consistent decision in McConnell ignores the larger lesson. It is the
Supreme Court, finally, that must provide the guidance to navigate
the campaign finance thicket.
("Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found ... a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [the issue] ... .
19 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
